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The functioning of groundwater markets in 
hard rock areas of the semi arid dry zone of 
Karnataka show two types of arrangements. 
In the first one, irrigation services are 
provided on demand and water charge is 
levied on hourly basis. In the second one, 
irrigation services are provided for the whole 
crop season, and cash equivalent of a fixed 
share of crop produce is paid as water 
charge. For water buyers, crop sharing 
arrangement yielded higher returns than that 
under hourly rates. Comparative analysis of 
allocative efficiencies of input use for sellers 
and buyers in groundwater markets show 
that water buyers obtain higher economic 
efficiency in water used for crop production 
than sellers, though both buyers and sellers 





HighlightIn the semi-arid zones of peninsular India, 
growth of irrigation wells has been so high that 
groundwater abstraction has exceeded natural 
recharge leading to scarcity of water. 
Groundwater irrigation is still the key to 
agricultural growth as it contributes about 56 
percent to total irrigation. Since the development 
of groundwater is dominated by private 
investment, access to water is unequal in areas 
where well-drilling is capital intensive. 
Groundwater markets as informal institutions 
ensure access to irrigation for those who can ill 
afford to invest in exploiting the resource.  
Groundwater markets are important in areas 
which depend heavily on groundwater for 
irrigation. They enable many farmers to access 
water. The creamy section of rural society, having 
better access to institutional finance and large 
landholdings, can invest in deepening the existing 
wells and drilling additional ones. The 
ambivalence between equity and sustainability in 
groundwater irrigation is, therefore, becoming 
apparent. Groundwater markets can promote 
equity in access to irrigation as investment on 
wells is well beyond the means of small and 
marginal farmers. Subsidized electricity supply in 
the farm sector will benefit poor farmers by 
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creating competitive water markets with lowered 
water charges. This study aims at analyzing the 
dynamics of water markets in water scarce areas 
with focus on functioning of groundwater 
markets, water pricing mechanisms, and 
economics.
The study pertains to the central dry zone of 
Karnataka. The area is characterized by high 
density of bore wells and the zone in which it falls 
2 has many tehsils declared as 'dark’  by the 
Department of Mines and Geology. Annual 
rainfall in the zone ranges between 455 and 718 
mm. Based on the intensity and functioning of 
water markets, four villages were taken up for 
detailed investigation. The selected villages were 
Siddapura, Thippanahalli, D. V. Halli and 
Kambathanahalli. A sample of 100 farmers was 
selected comprising 50 water sellers and 50 water 
buyers. 
Irrigation Cost
Investment in a borewell was amortized over 10 
years (the average life of bore wells), at 14 percent 
per annum (opportunity cost of capital) to arrive 
at the annual cost of selling groundwater for the 
well owners. 
   nn Amortized cost (A) = CB* [1+ i] *  i  / {[1 + i ]- 1 }
where CB = cost of bore well at current price.  
Resource Use Efficiency
Farmers aim at allocating the available scarce 
resource in the most efficient manner such that 
METHODOLOGY
Groundwater markets as informal 
institutions provide access to groundwater 
irrigation benefiting resource-poor farmers 
who are constrained to invest on expensive 
and risky bore well irrigation. 3
marginal benefits are equated across all uses. An 
attempt is made here to explore how resource use 
efficiency differed between water buyers and water 
sellers. Considering different functional 
forms—linear, Cobb-Douglas, quadratic and 
transcendental; the Cobb-Douglas model offered 
econometrically meaningful results. The estimated 
function is:
Log Y  = log a  + b  log X   + b log X   + b  log  11 2   23
X +  b log  X 34   4
where  Y = annual gross return per farm (in 
rupees), X  = volume of groundwater used per  1
farm per year (in gallons), X  = irrigated area per  2
farm (in acres), X  = value of farmyard manure  3
and fertilizers applied per farm per year (in 
rupees), and X = value of bullock and human  4
labour services used per farm per year (in rupees). 
The function was estimated separately for water 
sellers and water buyers.
Since the production function is for the whole 
farm, we used gross returns from all crops 
irrigated with groundwater. Explanatory variables 
contributing to multicollinarity were deleted.
The value of marginal product (VMP) of a 
resource is computed at the geometric mean level 
of dependent (Y) and independent variable as 
VMP = b Y/ X xi  i  i
Investment in Borewells
The investment in drilling a borewell is around 
Rs.72,202, the cost of exploration forming 31 
percent of the total (Figure 1). The cost of 
extraction mechanism with all accessories (casing, 
pumpset, HDPE pipes, electricity and tank) 
formed a major share (50 percent) of the capital 
cost. Thus, extraction of groundwater is relatively 
more expensive than exploration even without 
including costs of pumping. Well drilling entails 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
huge investment besides associated risk of well 
failure. This prevents resource-poor, small, and 
marginal farmers from investing in borewells. 
Majority of farmers used field channels for water 
conveyance and some invested in plastic pipes. 
Borewell owning farmers constructed an earthen 
farm pond to store water. 
Of the annual variable cost, excluding energy cost, 
62 percent is for repairs of equipment and the 
balance for replacement of components and labor 
charges. The variable cost component, though 
negligible, adds to irrigation cost in the absence of 
electricity cost. The yearly amortized irrigation 
cost including variable cost is Rs. 16,560.
Dimension of Groundwater Market
For every groundwater seller, there were nearly 
two water buyers in the study area. Decision-
making and pricing behavior closely resembles 
bilateral monopoly, with buyers and sellers 
dictating terms in the market. Water rent in the 
study area is relatively competitive since the hourly 
charges for groundwater are uniform irrespective 
of crops cultivated and type of irrigation.
Incidence of water markets is not pervasive but 
localized. Well owners sold water mainly during 
the kharif season (78 percent) and to some extent 
in summer. Water buyers were always at the mercy 
Deepening charges 12% 
Cost of extraction & conveyance 50%  
Cost of exploration 31% 
Pump house cost 7%
Source: Based on Primary Survey
Figure 1: Investment on Borewell Irrigation 
by Groundwater Sellers 
Cost of extraction of groundwater is higher 
than the cost of exploration. This is 
because of the increasing risk of well 
failure. This prevents small and marginal 
farmers from investing in borewellsof water sellers since the seller always had the 
option of not selling water.
Functioning of Water Markets
A differential mode of payment for water existed 
in the area. About 45 percent of payments were 
through crop share contracts and cash payment 
was made in 39 percent of cases. About 22 
percent of water buying farmers entered into 
contracts for more than a year.  Water sellers were 
not ready to enter into long-term agreements or 
contracts owing to uncertainty in water 
supply/availability, as droughts were a common 
feature. In paddy, virtually there was no cash 
payment while for ragi (finger millet) and 
groundnut both cash payment and crop sharing 
prevailed. Water selling took place only after the 
sellers met their own requirements.
The most common sharing arrangement involved 
charging for water at one-third of the value of 
crop produce. Cash payment was preferred in 39 
percent of water buying cases on hourly basis 
(Figure 2). Water sellers insisted on part payment 
of cash ranging between 25 and 50 percent of the 
approximate water rent at the beginning of the 
crop season. This was done to avoid default in the 
event of crop failure and the balance amount  was 
paid at the end of the season. 
A few groundwater sellers exchanged water for 
labor to perform agricultural operations. Thus, 
interlocking the water market with the labor 
market. However, these interlocked markets were 
not conspicuous. There were two cases of 
interlocked markets: (i) water market linked with 
credit and inputs where groundwater was 
exchanged for interest free loan, and (ii)services 
of animal power were exchanged with 
groundwater. In such markets, in addition to 
payment of water rent, water buyers were 
expected to render certain free services 
(participating in agricultural operations  such as 
weeding, inter-cropping, and so on) to the seller. 
Water buyers opined that irrigation provision was 
timely and adequate, as area irrigated by buyers 
was small. In addition to physical proximity of 
land, social relations between buyer and seller 
influenced the sale and purchase of groundwater 
as the percentage of kith and kin in total 
transaction was modest 30 and neighbors 
constituted around 40 percent.  
Comparison of Crop Share and Cash Payment 
Basis
In groundwater markets, water charge is levied in 
terms of either crop share or hourly basis. The 
crop-sharing arrangement usually leads to an 
assured market for water since water 
sale/purchase is for the entire season. Water 
charge is usually levied on the basis of the market 
value of one-third or one-fourth of the crop yield.  
Here the bargaining power rests with the seller 
even though the risk of crop loss is almost equally 
shared between the seller and buyer. The higher 
bargaining power of the seller is because of 
higher rate charged for water on per acre 
and on per acre-inch basis compared with 
the rate charged on hourly basis. Charging 
of water on hourly basis usually leads to an 
ad hoc market since the buyer has the 
option to buy water only as and when 
needed. Here the buyer has greater 
freedom and hence greater bargaining 
power. In water-scarce areas, crop-share 
based pricing of water prevails, and in 
relatively less scarce areas, hourly water 
rates rule. 
The price of water estimated in both acre 
(area) and “acre-inch (volume) terms was found to 




























Figure 2: Type of Water Markets 
Source: Based on Primary Survey
4
Not all the well-owning farmers were 
involved in water selling. Only a few well 
owners with surplus groundwater (after 
meeting their requirement) sold their water.be higher in crop-sharing arrangement than under 
ad hoc market with hourly water charges (Table 1). 
The price differential in the crop share market is 
98 percent for ragi and 90 percent for groundnut. 
This is the reason for prevalence of crop share 
based water market in 65 percent of the cases of 
water selling, with water sellers enjoying 
bargaining power over the buyers. This pricing 
mechanism, however, belies the hypothesis that 
water prices are usually lower in assured markets 
compared with ad hoc markets. Groundwater 
markets operating in scarcity areas vest bargaining 
power with water sellers. 
Cropping Pattern and Intensity
The cropping pattern is more or less uniform 
among water buyers and water sellers, though 
water buyers devoted marginally higher 
proportion of area for paddy (60 percent) 
compared to water sellers (55 percent). 
Groundnut dominated the crop pattern of both 
water buyers and water sellers during summer. In 
kharif, paddy was dominant among water sellers 
while paddy and ragi dominated the crop pattern 
among water buyers. During kharif, availability of 
groundwater is relatively higher than in other 
seasons. Hence, the volume of water sale was 
higher in kharif than other seasons. About 60 
percent of groundwater use was for paddy by 
both the groups. In spite of access to 
groundwater, cash crops like vegetables and fruits 
have not been raised because of lack of market in 
the region. The cropping intensity of water sellers 
was higher (231 percent) than that of water buyers 
(159 percent) as own source of irrigation enabled 
water sellers to increase cropping intensity. 
Productivity of water use in paddy was 25 percent 
higher on water sellers' farms than on water 
buyers' farms, as sellers had greater control over 
irrigation water. Volume of groundwater used by 
ECONOMICS OF WATER MARKETS















































Ragi 4.69 One-fourth 1350 288
Rs. 6 to 






Groundnut 5.32 One-fourth 1466 276
Rs. 6 to 







Note: Hourly charges of water varied between Rs. 8 to Rs. 12 depending on the crop
Source: Based on Primary Surveywater sellers for paddy per acre (51 acre-inches 
for paddy) was marginally higher than that used 
by water buyers (48 acre-inches). Water buyers 
paid 0.83 paise per gallon of water (or Rs 189 per 
acre-inch) and realized a return of 2.6 paise.  After 
deducting the water charges, buyers realized a net 
return of 1.75 paise per gallon of water. Water 
sellers incurred 0.48 paise per gallon of water sold 
and realized a return of 0.84 paise,  a net return of 
0.36 paise per gallon of water after meeting water 
rent (Table 2). Water charges are the highest for 
ragi (Rs. 270/acre-inch) followed by groundnut 
(Rs. 122/acre-inch) and paddy (Rs. 78/acre-inch). 
Water Use Efficiency
In case of water sellers, per acre costs and returns 
were higher for paddy and groundnut compared 
to water buyers. There was a gap in productivity 
between water buyers' and water sellers' farms 
owing to the differential reliability of irrigation 
water supplies. The variable cost component was 
higher for water sellers than for water buyers 
owing to use of higher doses of inputs. For water 
buyers, water rent formed 20 to 30 percent of the 
cost of production. Water sellers realized higher 
yield of paddy (25.30 quintals) than water buyers 
(20 quintals). In the case of other crops, water 
buyers had higher productivity than water sellers 
owing to higher water use efficiency. There is a 
sharp difference with respect to irrigation cost. 
For sellers, amortized irrigation cost per acre of 
gross irrigated area was higher (45 percent of total 
cost in paddy, 9 percent in ragi, and 18 percent in 
groundnut). For buyers, irrigation cost per acre 
(actual rent paid to water seller) formed 31 




1. Actual water used per acre (in gallons) by
       1160848 120290 309544
  Water Seller         (51.34) (5.32) (13.69)
  Water Buyer       1085328 113055 271332
(48.00) (5.00) (12.00)
1062717 106271.7 264548.7 2. Recommended water requirement
(47.00) (5) (12)
3. Crop Productivity realized 
(in quintals) per acre by
     Water Seller  25.0 11.0 6.0
     Water Buyer 20.0 11.4 6.0
4. Cost per gallon of water  0.00276 0.0143 0.0081
purchased (in Rs.)
5. Water rent paid per acre (in Rs.) 3750 1350 1465
6. Imputed water rent paid  78 270 122
on per acre inch basis    (in Rs.)
7. Return per gallon of  0.00829 0.0453 0.0243
water purchased (in Rs.) (187.45) (1024.28) (549.45)
0.00479 8. Cost per gallon of water sold (in Rs.)*
(108.31)
0.00838 9. Return per gallon of water sold (in Rs.)*
(189.48)
Table 2: Economics of Water Markets
Note: Figures in parentheses are acre-inches of water  [ * Pooled data ]
Source: Based on Primary Surveyshows that the imputed water rents are lower 
whereas market rents are relatively higher, 
reflecting a higher opportunity cost of irrigation.
Resource Use Efficiency
The Cobb-Douglas production function estimated 
separately for water sellers and water buyers gave 
the following results:
Annual gross return per farm of water sellers = 
5.3535 + 0.180* X + 0.386* X + 0.249* X + 0.019* X 1234                   
(0.052)        (0.086)          (0.097)       (0.191)     
2 R  =0.49, n=50
Annual gross return per farm of water buyers = 
2.4457+0.322*X + 0.273*X -0.01 X + 0.339* X 12 3 4
(0.121)        (0.108)     (0.468)       (0.137)                            
2 R  =0.51, n=50
* significant at 1 percent level of significance
The elasticity of gross return for volume of water 
used was 0.32 for water buyers and 0.18 for water 
sellers. Thus, water buyers realized higher elasticity 
of gross return for water compared with water 
sellers. Since buyers paid the marginal cost of 
water, they were relatively more efficient in water 
use than water sellers. 
Allocative Efficiency
Irrigation water was used more efficiently by water 
buyers than water sellers, as their marginal product 
value/marginal factor cost ratio (0.81) was closer 
to unity compared to that of water sellers, who 
had a ratio of 0.58. Water buyers took care in 
utilizing the purchased water as they were paying 
rent for the resource. 
Since agriculture is heavily dependent on 
groundwater irrigation in the central dry zone of 
Karnataka, informal water markets are playing a 
prominent role by expanding access to 
groundwater for small and marginal farmers and 
other peasants who cannot afford owning wells. 
Water markets have, thus, become a key source of 
irrigation for many farmers sustaining their 
incomes. 
MAJOR FINDINGS
Crop sharing prevailed in 45 percent of water 
sales while cash payment prevailed in 39 percent. 
For semi-dry crops, which have low water 
requirement (like ragi and groundnut), both crop 
sharing and cash payment type of contracts 
existed. But for water intensive paddy crop, only 
the crop share method was prevalent. The price 
for water is charged on the basis of the market 
value of crop output (one-third or one-fourth). In 
water scarce areas, crop share basis of water 
pricing prevails and in relatively less scarce areas, 
per hour charges rule.
Comparison of crop economics of farmers who 
buy water on crop-sharing basis and those who 
buy water on hourly rates showed that crop-
sharing arrangement yielded higher returns. Both 
the groups used more water than recommended. 
Groundwater use facilitated multiple cropping, 
and contributed to higher cropping intensity for 
water sellers (231 percent) than water buyers (159 
percent), since purchased water is unreliable and 
fraught with risk. The imputed water rents are 
lower than the market rent. 
Groundwater, unlike surface water, is expensive 
and relatively scarce and hence should be used to 
grow crops that are responsive to protective 
irrigation, require less water and are remunerative. 
Sellers and buyers of groundwater have put large 
areas under paddy, a water-intensive crop. This 
needs to be disciplined through effective 
groundwater institutions. Groundwater literacy 
has to be promoted by educating farmers on the 
pros and cons of overexploitation. For farmers 
who do not own wells, one way to enable access 
to water is through group investments in well 
irrigation. This would require provision for 
institutional credit for such groups and 
energization of pumpsets.  This will provide an 
environment of sharing available groundwater 
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